In this paper it is analysed whether the euro-crisis has induced a change in the degree of Europeanization of national public spheres. It is argued that 'mediatizing politics' on TV is a prerequisite for the accountability structures of liberal democracies. Examining the degree of Europeanization of public broadcaster news in Germany and the Netherlands in 2008 and 2011 this paper gauges the changes in terms of visibility of European issues and in terms of salience of items on European issues. Moreover it is analysed which news categories predominate, the tone of news items on European issues, and which explicit evaluations of European integration appear -and how these elements are affected by the euro-crisis. Finally, it is shown that although the Europeanization of public spheres increased as the euro-crisis developed, the EU was mostly portrayed negatively, focused predominantly on economic issues and political contestation was hardly visible. *
Introduction
The ambitious project of European integration is not faring well. While the members of the euro-zone initially believed they could get off scot-free, the rage of the financial markets in 2009 roared towards Europe, shaking the unstable fundaments of the monetary union, and the European Union (EU) in general. At the same time, Eurosceptic voices have become more pronounced questioning the EU's democratic legitimacy as well as its capacity for accountable decision-making. In this context, it is relevant to examine what the effect of this 'negative trend' in European affairs has had on the Europeanization of national public spheres. As will be discussed below, the Europeanization of the national public sphere refers to the extent to which 'European affairs' are (becoming) visible and salient in the national public spheres of European countries. Studying whether some form of European public sphere is emerging or not is especially significant as it is closely interwoven with the question of democratic credence of Europe's governance structures. As Kaelble remarked, 'the reinforcement of a European public sphere does not necessarily coincide with a more intensive European integration ' (2010, 27) . On the contrary, as a crisis of European integration invokes debate throughout European societies, it might even prove conducive to the formation of a European public sphere. It is this line of thought this essay intends to follow and test empirically.
As three quarters of the Europeans watch television news daily (Norris 2000) , TV news presents the most significant source of information on European affairs for most 'ordinary citizens'. This essay will examine how 'negative' political developments affect the Europeanization of public spheres by comparing the level of Europeanization in public broadcasting television news before the escalation of the European sovereign debt crisis in 2008 with the degree of Europeanization during this crisis in 2011 in two European countries, namely, Germany and the Netherlands. By coding over 1200 news items from over 100 news bulletins, the data allows us to make preliminary conclusions about each news item's dimension, its news type, its salience, and its overall tone. Moreover, it will be gauged to what extent explicit (opposing) evaluations of the EU were present.
Before elucidating the research design, the normative utility of a Europe-wide public sphere and how this might be observed empirically will be briefly discussed. Subsequently, the results will be discussed followed by a discussion of their theoretical implications.
The European Public Sphere and the Quality of Democracy
In the light of the debates on the enduring 'democratic deficit' of EU decisionmaking the significance of a common European public sphere for the quality of democracy in Europe is often emphasized. In normative terms it can be argued that open participation in public debate and the ability to challenge public authorities within the public sphere is a prerequisite for the creation of a legitimate political community that underpins liberal democracy (e.g. sense of a shared predicament with other Europeans can then be developed gradually in the unfolding political process rather than proclaimed (and perhaps rejected) at a decisive constitutional moment ' (2010, 118) .
Such a gradual formation of a common European communicative space has been deemed impossible due to the insurmountable obstacles of linguistic and cultural diversity among Europe's citizens (e.g. Smith 1992; Grimm 1997) .
From this perspective, democracy on EU level is inevitably deficient as there is no potential for a common public 'space' where the central practices of citizenship can take shape. In keeping with the presently predominant social constructivist approach, however, Adam Ferguson already emphasized that the 'spirit' (or 'national spirit') which potentially stems from the 'concern for common affairs' does not require a pre-political bond and, thus, does not need to exist before the interaction takes place (Terrier and Wagner 2006, 16) . This is reminiscent of the much cited transactionalist account by Karl W. Deutsch (1957) on the potential for cross-border rapprochement of identities and the creation of a sense of a shared fate through social communication. In such Deutschian terms, a 'common' can be created though interaction, and interaction only. It is important to recognize that these reflections on how a political bond may be conceived is predominantly an ideological matter rather than primarily empirical as it is 'bound up in broader questions of the health of contemporary democracy', as White noted (2010, 119) . Indeed, the 'essentialist' rejections of a European public sphere such as those from Grimm or Smith are strongly related to certain normative conceptions of democracy and of the nature of deliberation and debate (e.g. Habermas 1997; Trenz and Eder 2004) .
Among those that regard the emergence of a European public sphere as plausible, we can discern three different empirical approaches. First, we can identify those scholars who envisage a European public sphere essentially as a replication of the national public sphere on a transnational, European level.
These approaches conceive of the development of a European public sphere as the emergence of pan-European mass media such as the TV channel Euronews or the weekly European Voice. Scholars relying on this conceptualization come, understandably, with negative conclusions about its emergence (e.g. Schlesinger 1995) . Unitary European transnational mass media is likely to remain a marginal and elitist phenomenon.
The two remaining empirical approaches argue that is more fruitful to study the process of the Europeanization of national public spheres, rather than assessing whether a single, unitary European public sphere will or can emerge. These approaches recognize the continuing centrality of national society for ordinary citizens, while at the same time acknowledging the pervasiveness of transnationalization in Europe as a result of European integration. The second kind of empirical approaches comprises those scholars that conceptualize the Europeanization of public spheres as the emergence of a single 'European perspective' as expressed in national media as well as the increasing relevance of common European symbols (e.g. Kaelble
2002; Diez Medrano 2009).
Thirdly, we can discern empirical approaches that operationalize the Europeanization of the public sphere as the visibility and presence of 'European issues' in the national media. These 'European issues' can be conceptualized as issues having an explicit EU focus. (e.g. Gerhards 2000; Peter et al. 2003) Or, alternatively, a less restrictive view of the Europeanization of public spheres focuses both on the presence of EU issues and issues on 'other European countries/actors' in national public discourse (e.g. Eder & Kantner 2000; Trenz 2010; Risse 2010; Koopmans & Statham 2010a; Wessler et al. 2008) . The distinction between EU issues and issues on 'other European countries/actors is what Koopmans and colleagues have labelled as 'vertical' and 'horizontal Europeanization' respectively (Koopmans and Erbe 2004, 101; Koopmans and Statham 2010b, 28) . From the abovementioned approaches we can distil four main indicators for the Europeanization of national public spheres (cf. Machill et al. 2006, 63-4; Risse 2010, 116-119, Koopmans and Statham 2010b (Machill et al. 2006, 79) . I would argue that increase over time in the four abovementioned indicators is the determining factor for identifying Europeanization of national public spheres (see also Koopmans and Sthatam 2010b, 43) . After all, 'Europeanization' refers to a (gradual) process in which 'Europe' becomes more visible and national news is to a greater extent synchronized thematically with other European countries' news.
As Chantal Mouffe stressed, democracy is unthinkable without a 'vibrant "agonistic" public sphere of contestation where different hegemonic political projects can be confronted ' (2005, 3 ). Mouffe's agonistic perspective of politics recognizes that in human sociability reciprocity and hostility are inherently intertwined concepts. Importantly, opponents should not be seen as enemies but as adversaries. The concept of 'agonism' in democratic theory emphasizes that although adversaries do engage in a confrontation trying to defeat one another, this defeat should never definite. For the sake of the principle of parity, conflict and confrontation must be continuous. In this regard, polarization and contestation should be seen as crucial preconditions for an emerging European public sphere (Risse 2010, 112) . Therefore, the Europeanization of national public spheres might augment considerably when Europe's societies are confronted with a common crisis demanding contentious decisions. Indeed, in precarious times when weighty decisions on both substantive and institutional issues are taken a proliferation of contestation might be expected. For these reasons, it is of additional relevance to examine the extent to which television coverage on European affairs shows elements of adversarialism and agonistic politics.
In their meta-analysis of European public sphere studies, Machill et al. show that the generally shared conclusion for all states, also for Germany and the Netherlands, is that EU reporting only accounts for a small part of the total reporting (Machill et al. 2006) . Nevertheless, Koopmans et al. show that as European integration deepened over the course of the 1990s, vertical Europeanization has increased (Koopmans, Erbe and Meyer 2010, 68-9) . In a similar study, Koopmans and Erbe conclude that the extent of EU coverage by the German print media differs per issue area (2004) . The authors argue that the German media 'adequately reflect the Europeanization of policy-making' by reporting more EU issues on those policy areas where the EU has acquired competences in (ibid.). Taking monetary policy as an example, Koopmans and Erbe argue that 'the most important determinant of patterns of mass media coverage is simply where the decision-making power in a policy field is concentrated. ' (ibid., 155) . This responsiveness of (vertical) Europeanization to the EU's political development leads to the expectation to see an increase EU level news on economic-financial matters on as the euro-crisis unfolded.
Moreover, Machill et al show that all European public sphere studies under discussion emphasize that EU reporting tends to augment at particular points in time, around particular events (Machill et al. 2006, 76) . Indeed, ' [t]he analysis shows that the intensity of EU reporting always increases rapidly when a topic that is of interest EU-wide or at least in several EU states is connected with a particular event.' (ibid.). Although the 'euro-crisis' is not exactly an 'event', it nevertheless qualifies as atypical circumstance compared to the progression of European integration before that is likely to increase the degree of Europeanization of national public spheres.
Research Design

Method and case selection
The focus of the empirical research in this essay lies on the Europeanization of televised news. A recent Eurobarometer survey revealed that for 79% of the respondents television was their main source of information on European political affairs. This stands in stark contrast with the 47% of respondents who designated the print media as their primary source of information on European political affairs (European Commission 2011, 17) . The survey moreover revealed that the respondents regarded televised news more trustworthy than news in the print media. Thus, although the scope for deliberation and debate is much smaller in television news than in, say, broadsheet 'quality' newspapers, it is imperative to examine the actual level of Europeanization the majority of the 'ordinary citizens' in Germany and the Netherlands are exposed to, and whether these have altered during the progression of the euro-crisis. To be sure, the limited sample size does not allow for making reliable conclusions about the (non-)existence of a European(ized) public sphere in general. However, this paper's explicit focus is to find whether there are indicators that signal a cross-temporal change in the extent of Europeanization of public broadcasting media before and during the European debt crises in Germany and the Netherlands. of political news in the national media, thereby disregarding levels of 'horizontal Europeanization'. The present study therefore will take horizontal Europeanization into account. Moreover, as the aim of the present study is to assess whether the extent and substance of 'European coverage' has changed during the euro-crisis, a cross-temporal element has been included. Another important difference with the measures of Peter et al. (2003) and the present study is that Peter et al. did not differentiate between the tone of a news item and the presence of explicit evaluations. In the present study, the tone of a news item refers to whether public broadcasters depicted the news item positively, negatively or neutrally. 'Evaluations', on the other hand, point to the presence of explicit assessments of European integration voiced by political actors in the news item. To what extent has the visibility of European Union increased in the evening television news over the course of the 'euro-crisis'?
RQ 2
To what extent has the visibility of (actors of) other European countries (horizontal Europeanization) increased in the evening television news over the course of the 'euro-crisis'? RQ 3 Which types of news were predominant on the EU and on other European countries before and during the 'eurocrisis'? RQ 4 How has the salience of European news changed over the course of the 'euro-crisis'? RQ 5 How has the tone of EU news coverage changed over the course of the 'euro-crisis'?
To what extent has contestation on EU issues been visible?
The research questions are presented in Table 1 . For both countries, two natural fourteen-day samples of public broadcasters' evening news (April and September) have been selected for coding.
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In these samples, all news items have been coded for both 2008 and 2011. 3 As the temporal range for both years has been limited to a two-week sample in April and September, it was essential that no major European or domestic events had taken place during or around those weeks as this would reduce the reliability of the empirics and, consequently, obscure the validity of the conclusions. Germany and the Netherlands have been selected based on the fact that the style of political communication and the format of the public broadcasting news are relatively similar (Heinderyckx 1993; Peter et al. 2003, 311 
Results
Visibility
In Figure 1 the visibility of each news dimension for April and September 2008 for both countries are shown. As can be seen for both countries, domestic news in the evening news bulletin is predominant constituting more than half of all news stories. Peter et al. (2003, 314) It is also surprising that the Germany's degree of vertical Europeanization is much higher than in the Netherlands. Yet, it should be noted that the overall tone and style of the ARD Tagesschau is more formal than the NOS Journaal and that the level of sophistication of political affairs tends to be higher in the The fact that 'horizontal Europeanization' seems not have increased in the course of the eurocrisis might be explained by the method of coding news dimensions in a mutually exclusive way. A news item could be labelled with only one of the four news dimensions -'domestic', 'EU, 'other European country', 'international'. As was to be expected, in almost all news items concerning the euro-crisis, other European countries had a prominent place in the item. Yet, since the news stories on the economic crisis mostly addressed the issues as 'European' issues -mentioning not only actors from the specific European country (in this case often Greece) but also from other European countries and EU officials -the news items were labelled as being 'European' The political claims approach Koopmans and Statham (2010b) employ, is better capable of capturing these nuances. Yet, this approach requires a lot more resources. For our present purpose, this manner of coding seems sufficient.
way' to EU-related items, in the Netherlands domestic coverage declined only by 1%. 6
Figure 2. Visibility all news items April and September 2011
News categories
Having confirmed that vertical Europeanization has increased during the course of the euro-crisis, it is illuminating to see whether we can witness a change in the news categories of the Europeanized news stories. As the degree of vertical Europeanization was rather low in 2008 for both Germany and the Netherlands, the amount of observations was low. This is most clearly the case with the Netherlands. Notwithstanding, the present data indicates a relevant trend that should be tested further empirically in future research. This suggests that we can witness a trend wherein the euro-crisis contributes to negative coverage of the EU and its policies. In line with this trend, a considerable change occurred in the issue negativity for EU items on economic issues. For example, whereas in 2008 only approximately 30% of the 'economic' stories were accompanied by a negative tone, in 2011 over 80%
were negatively portrayed in both countries (not shown). Although partly explained by the relatively small number of observations, another explanation might be the enduring 'permissive consensus' on specific EU policy issues despite the rise of Eurosceptic parties (in the Netherlands).
The Netherlands Germany
This, we can speculate, has led the public broadcasters to think that political contestation of EU matters were not newsworthy enough to make the evening television news. Remarkably, in none of the instances where 'evaluations' were present 'Europhile' voices were predominant. This means that for both years in both Germany and the Netherlands, no actors were voiced that were outspokenly positive on the EU (in this sample).
Discussion
To recapitulate, this paper examined the changes in the degrees of Europeanization in the television broadcasting news in Germany and the Netherlands over the course of the euro-crisis. The results shown above imply that the escalation of the euro-crisis has positively affected the visibility of European affairs. However, news coverage on 'other European countries' had slightly decreased. Furthermore, the data indicates that in this period of crisis the salience of European news items has increased. In particular, the results imply that the controversy over the national sovereign debt crises has led to a predominance of economic and financial news with regards to the EU. Yet, the data suggests that this increase 'vertical Europeanization' comes at a cost as it is accompanied by a considerable increase in issue negativity of EU affairs. Finally, the empirical findings suggest that the presence of some 
RQ 1
To what extent has the visibility of European Union increased in the evening television news over the course of the 'euro-crisis'?
Increased by 5.7 %.
RQ 2
To what extent has the visibility of (actors of) other European countries (horizontal Europeanization) increased in the evening television news over the course of the 'eurocrisis'?
Decreased by 0.6 %.
RQ 3
Which type of EU news was most predominant before and during the 'euro-crisis'?
2008: Foreign policy* 2011: Economic news.
RQ 4
How has the salience of European news changed over the course of the 'euro-crisis'?
EU news became three times more 'highly salient' RQ 5 How has the tone of EU news coverage changed over the course of the 'euro-crisis'?
EU news became more negative. More than 50 % of the messages were negative.
RQ 5
Lack of deliberation.
* Due to Sarkozy's involvement in the Russia-Georgia crisis.
degree of 'socializing conflict' and adversarialism was extremely low. Table 2 briefly summarizes the results by providing succinct answers to the research questions.
As Machill et al (2006) remark, scholars studying the Europeanization of public spheres account for national differences in their data by referring to the particular predominance of a domestic event or of particular national actors.
Arguably, the emergence of pressing issues on a European level would remove or reduce such cases of national specificity. This is indeed what the data has shown. Nevertheless in line with previous studies (Peter et al. 2003 , Machil et al. 2006 , Koopmans and Statham 2010a ) coverage of 'European affairs' still accounts only for small part of the total reporting. Yet, as the study by Koopmans and Statham has shown, the 'European level is visible in fields in which it is influential.' (Statham 2010a, 285) . The findings presented in this paper also underline this thesis. Once decisions taken on EU level (albeit predominantly through intergovernmental negotiation) have significant repercussions for its members, the EU's visibility augmented. Paul Statham challenges the idea of rising public dissatisfaction with the EU due to a 'communication deficit ' (2010b) . According to Statham, the media 'tends to follow the political system in Europe' and represents the political debate more than leading it (ibid., 139). On the one hand this seems plausible.
The news media of course cannot be held responsible for this 'wave of negativity' as they are merely reporting such negative developments like the sovereign debt crises. On the other hand, however, such a perspective fails to recognize the role the media play as intermediary agents in the political This is problematic as openly publicised conflict over substantive issues is highly significant for the health of a (European) democracy as well as for the processual formation of a conception of a political bond. Indeed, we should understand conflict not necessarily as a negative phenomenon, but far more as a 'ubiquitous social phenomenon of modern societies' (Schuppert 2008, 465) . Georg Simmel has demonstrated how conflict is a central component of the process of socialization of a society or a 'common'. 'Conflict itself', Simmel wrote, 'is the resolution of the tension between the contraries ' (1904, 490) .
Conflict is a social tool to cope with (societal) discord and is instrumental in restoring or creating unity. In this sense, 'conflict' is a central element of social interaction that has an integrative and even stabilizing function (cf. Schuppert 2008, 465) . Moreover, as Nollmann notes, conflicts are 'productive' in the sense that they have the ability to redefine norms and rules and should for this reason be seen as a 'source of social change ' (Nollmann 1997, 20; cf. Schuppert 2008, 468 ).
The results above, however, suggest that these conflicts with regards to the European Union are not recognized sufficiently by the Dutch and German public broadcasters. At least, adversarialism on European affairs is not given a platform on the most important stage of national politics, namely the evening television news. The fact that adversarialism is not covered in television news, however, does not mean it does not exist. Yet, it seems that the platform for contestation is elsewhere. The print media, by virtue of its format, is more suitable to reflect and give platform to diverging political positions. The public broadcasters, however, fail to cover and represent political debate and contestation in their most prominent news bulletins. This is problematic since the mass media have by virtue of their democratic responsibility a 'postulate of reflectance' ('Widerspiegelungspostulat') (Detjen 1998, 276; cf. Schuppert 2008, 264) . It is therefore not only their task to address all relevant issues but also to reflect the existing political pluralism. As the public broadcasters fail to fulfil this postulate, the task of 'pluralistic reflectance' is left to the written media only. Thereby, a majority of the citizens -who designate TV as their main source of information on political affairs -will be bypassed.
Being hardly confronted by substantive political debate on EU affairs, and yet overwhelmed by negative coverage on the EU, it seems unlikely that citizen's engagement in European affairs will be fostered. Nevertheless, the results above suggest how quickly national public spheres can 'Europeanize'. Whether this shift in the level of Europeanization of national public spheres is a temporary phenomenon or a persisting alteration however remains uncertain. On the one hand, the extensive focus on EU news stories of extraordinary high news value might suggest that as the euro-crisis wanes, the levels of Europeanization will drop to 'normal'. On the other hand, if the assumption is correct that the current sovereign debt crises can only be solved by a closer union, sharing sovereignty on fiscal matters, this European economic crisis may have effectuated a change in the levels of Europeanization that is here to stay. If this is the case, this development is likely to have significant implications for legitimate governance in the European Union. Indeed, increasingly Europeanized national public spheres present promising avenues of politicization (cf. Statham and Trenz 2013) . This is especially the case when also the television news media attempt to fulfil their 'postulate of reflectance', bringing substantive political debate on European affairs increasingly to Europe's living rooms.
